JOHN PALMER AND PLANTATION DEVELOPMENT IN WESTERN JAVA DURING THE EARLIER NINETEENTH CENTURY x
Plantation development by European entrepreneurs in early nineteenth century Java has to be viewed against a background of significant changes in the colonial infra-structure of the island. Under Dutch East India Company rule, overseas trade was largely carried on under the control of Dutch officialdom, and (with some exceptions in the Preanger Regencies of western Java) direct European involvement in the organisation of commercial agriculture was kept to a minimum.
The Dutch obtained most of their agricultural export (primarily coffee, rice, sugar and indigo) from levies on the local Javanese rulers who stood in a quasi-feudal relationship to the Company. In addition, a great deal of the sugar exported by the Company was supplied from plantations situated around Batavia and run, for the most part, by Chinese settlers. Private plantation enterprise by Europeans played little part in the Company's scheme of things. There were, indeed, a number of small, privately-owned estates (particuliere landerijen) 2 in the Batavia district whose proprietors were European or Eurasian servants of the Company. For this type of landowner, however, their estates were less likely to be full-time, true commercial speculations than convenient country retreats away from the heat and stench of the colonial capital. 3 Their agricultural output was almost exclusively geared to local consumption.
The effective abandonment of the Company system between the arrival of Governor-General Daendels in 1808 and the end of the British occupation of the colony eight years later, however, brought with it a number of important and. far-reaching changes. To replace Company officialdom, a private European mercantile community grew up at Batavia and the other major ports of the north Java coast, trading with India, Canton, New South Wales and Europe. At the same time, the colonial authorities eased the restrictions on European access to the interior of the island and sold large areas of western Java as private estates to European speculators. Elsewhere in the colony, by the early 1820's, there also existed many coffee-, sugar-and indigo-producing plantations run by Europeans on land hired or leased from its Javanese owners. 4 Nonetheless, the attitude of successive colonial regimes to these developments remained ambivalent. Deprived of the revenues previously assured by the Company's insistence on contingents and forced deliveries, the colonial governments of the post-1808 period were constantly on the look-out for a new means of exploiting Java's resources to their own advantage. Some influential voices, both in Batavia and The Hague, were strongly in favour of developing the colony through the medium of private European plantations and estates. The viability of such a course was questioned, however, on both humanitarian and practical grounds, by a number of high-placed officials, including G. A. Baron van der Capellen, Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies from 1819 until 1826. Van der Capellen and his advisors argued that not only did the European planters and land-owners oppress the local population, but also that they lacked the necessary expertise and finance to succeed in what they were trying to do. Instead, Van der Capellen appears to have favoured the retention of the Land Rent System introduced by Raffles during the British occupation of the colony, 1811-1816. Under this system, the peasantry (in theory at least) were left free to cultivate what crops they wished, on the assumption that economie self-interest would lead them to grow crops suitable for export. 4 The growth of a private European mercantile community at Batavia in the early nineteenth century has received little attention from historians. The best (but very brief) discussion remains that of W. M. F. Mansvelt in his preliminary sketch, De Eerste Indische Handelshuizen, Dept. van Economische Zaken, Centraal Kantoor voor de Statistiek, Mededeeling no. 168, Batavia, 1938 . Land sales and the general development of plantation agriculture in Java before the introduction of the Cultivation System are discussed in some detail in my unpublished London Ph.D. Thesis "Estates and Plantations in Java, 1812-1834" (1968) .
In short, the early nineteenth century saw a considerable and often bitter debate in Dutch colonial circles on how best to run their colony, a debate in which the issue of plantation-development by privately operating Europeans played an important role. 5 In the end, the debate was resolved in favour of a scheme whereby the government itself organised and financed the development of commercial agriculture in Java, using indigenous channels of control to produce the crops and European or Chinese contractors to do what processing was necessary for export. This was the essence of the Cultivation System introduced by Governor-General J. van den Bosch in 1830, and it remained the dominant exploitative device in Java for more than thirty years. Not until the 1860's was the question of the role of private European plantations again seriously raised, this time with such success that by the closing decades of the century the development of the island's* resources was almost entirely in the hands of private plantation companies. Nevertheless, despite its relative failure, the earlier, pre-1830 attempt at the development of a system of privately-run plantations in Java remains of considerable interest, not least for what it reveals of contemporary links between plantation development and both local and overseas mercantile interests.
Indeed, such plantation development as took place in the colony prior to the inauguration of the Cultivation System appears to have owed a great deal to the backing of local traders and their overseas business connections. By far and away the most important of the local, non-mercantile sources of finance for the island's European landowners was the Weeskamer or Orphan Chamber at Batavia, which by the early nineteenth century held mortgages on almost all the private estates of western Java. However, its capital was limited and its lending-powers were circumscribed by fairly rigid regulations, with the result that ambitious landowners or planters had to look elsewhere for their capital, primarily to the European and Chinese merchants of the major ports and to the Batavia factory of the N.H.M., the Dutch Trading Society, formed in 1824. Indeed, many of Java's early nineteenth century landowners and planters were themselves active as traders, either on the coast or in the interior. In addition, moreover, to local mercantile sources of funds, it appears that some degree of financial support was also derived from overseas, almost invariably from business connections in British India and Europe. The situation is, nonetheless, a fairly obscure one. 6 It is this which makes the case of the Calcutta merchant John Palmer's Java plantation interests so fascinating, for Palmer appears to be the only one of a small handful of overseas investors whose papers have survived even in a depleted state.
7 They form a significant source of information on both the fortunes of private estate agriculture during the critical 1820's and early 30's and the internal dynamics of a situation in which an overseas merchant became progressively more and more deeply involved in the plantation speculations of his agents at Batavia.
John Palmer was one of the leading Galcutta merchants of his day and his firm had extensive relations abroad. At Canton they were connected with Dent and Company, principal rivals of the ubiquitous Jardines. In London, their commercial correspondents included the East India house of Paxton Cockerill Trail and Company of Austin Friars.
8 Like most of the large agency houses of early nineteenth century Calcutta, Palmer's firm was involved in a wide variety of business ranging from trade on a commission-basis to ship-owning, banking, maritime insurance and the financing of the Bengal indigo industry. 0 A short discussion of the financing of plantation development in Java prior to 1830 is to be found in R. Palmer's connection with Java dated from the period of the British occupation of the colony (1811-1816). For some years, he appears to have conducted a fairly extensive trade with the island, mainly in cotton piece goods and opium. 10 In addition, for a decade after the restoration of the colony to the Dutch in 1816, Palmer was the Batavia government's commercial agent in Bengal. As such, he was several times involved in schemes to raise money for the near-bankrupt administration of Governor-General Van der Capellen. 11 By the mid- importance to Palmer of the agency-business for the Indies government emerges quite clearly from a letter written in the mid-twenties to a London correspondent: "I own a certain paternal attachment to that agency, which has been emminently valuable to us in all sorts of ways .. .," he explained, "they owe us, inclusive of 2nd loan notes, some eight or nine lacs of rupees, and these would be convenient just now, but I would prefer continued intercourse and yearly commissions and settlements to these sweeping and final adjustments; we certainly cannot employ the money so well elsewhere." Palmer to Trail, 4.5.1826, Eng. Lett. c. 103, pp. 260-61.
eighteen twenties, however, the Calcutta firm's participation in the Java trade had dwindled almost to nothing, 12 though this did not mean the end of Palmer's connection with the colony. Trading interests had by that time been replaced by plantation interests. From c. 1820 onwards Palmer was first financier and later co-owner of some sugar and indigo plantations in the Tjikandi Ilir district of the west Java Residency of Bantam, as well as financier of several European planters operating in the Principalities. Tjikandi Ilir was by far the most important of these investments, and Palmer's involvement there came about largely through the agency of Deans Scott and Company, an ambitious Batavia firm who were his commercial correspondents in Java from 1815 until their closure in 1821. For this reason, the character of the business carried on by Deans Scott and Company and the history of their overseas connections are well worth considering in some detail. The subject is not one which has received much attention from historians.
Deans Scott and Company were one of a number of European mercantile houses which were established at Batavia during the period of the British occupation of Java. Such firms were generally described as agency or commission houses, although the manner in which they operated and the origin of their financial resources is far from clear. Some contemporary authorities claimed, during the eighteen twenties, that the European traders of Batavia were no more than agents for overseas merchants and had little or no capital of their own. They were said to operate solely on a commission basis. 18 However, the accuracy of such statements is open to question, and there are clear indications that prior to the commercial crisis of the mid-twenties, Batavia's mercantile houses were engaged in many and varied speculations on their own account. In 1825, for instance, in reviewing the decayed state of commerce at Batavia, the thoroughly experienced Java merchant John Deans remarked that the town does not now contain what can strictly be called a mercantile house -agency is almost the sole business of the resident establishments, which in general affords little beyond a moderate subsistance. Commercial enterprise has ceased to exist, and adventures from Java are scarcely heard of. lts former opulance has disappeared, and its commercial capital reduced to a comparative pittance. 18 on the other hand, had a straightforwardly mercantile background. His family were traders at Penang, and he had been born in South-East Asia, the son of a country trader, and had found his way to Java c. 1811. Both he and Deans were employed in civilian capacities by the British authorities in Java prior to their setting-up in business together in 1814. In neither case would it seem that they had settled in Java at Palmer's behest, although the firm of Deans Scott and Company was undoubtedly Palmer's agents at Batavia from 1815 onwards.
The partnership which subsequently operated under their names was a fairly substantial one by the standards of the day. Deans Scott and Company had warehouses and offices at Samarang and Surabaya as well as at Batavia, and at one time had as many as six partners in the firm. 19 Until their winding-up in 1821 20 they were certainly one of the major agency houses operating in Java, and in addition to being John Palmer's agents in the colony they also had commercial and At the end of the twenties he parted company with the N.H.M, and appears to have been under something of a cloud owing to suspicions that he had swindled his employers on their opium sales in Sumatra. In the following decade, however, he was again employed in connection with the opium trade, this time as an Inspector of the Indies government's opium farms. To say the least, he appears to have had a rather chequered career. His own comment on his fortunes in 1828, for instance, was "miserable after twenty-two years in India . financial ties with the London East India house of Paxton Cockerill Trail and Company. As has already been mentioned, this latter firm was also London correspondent of Palmer and Company, so that in effect the Batavia house formed one corner in a triangular business relationship linking Java, British India and the City of London. Deans Scott and Company carried on what was essentially a wholesale trade. As John Deans himself remarked shortly af ter his return to England in 1828, "I imported largely British manufactures to Java, and the medium of communication with the natives was generally through the Chinese, who purchased from me in whole cases or bales, and retailed to natives ..." In addition to cotton goods, he also "had a great deal to do in the opium trade at Java," 21 and in this context it is significant that from 1814 until possibly as late as 1821 Deans Scott and Company held the government opium farm for the Samarang area of Java's north coast. 22 Nevertheless, the Batavia firm was not exclusively engaged in trade. Several of the partners were also involved in entrepreneurial and agricultural speculations. In 1813, for example, even bef ore the establishment of the partnership, Robert Scott had successfully appealed to the colonial authorities for permission to buy land on which to erect a cotton screw and warehouse near the south gate of Samarang. Six years later, Deans Scott and Company imported a cotton press and received permission to set-up an arak distillery in the town. 23 It was Scott who was in charge of the Samarang end of the business, and the indications are that the firm was closely connected with the predominantly Chineserun sugar industry in the neighbouring north coast districts. Scott, for instance, later described himself as having been a "great promoter of this sugar cultivation at Samarang," though according to his own account the venture had been a ruinous one financially. Not only did Scott himself lose money, but the failure of the speculatdon also led to the "complete ruin of hundreds of active and industrious Chinese." 27 and it would appear that from the outset they received financial support from the Batavia firm, 28 though any details of the commitment are lacking. What is evident, however, is that Tjikandi was no more successful than Deans Scott and Company's speculations at Samarang. Attempts to grow cotton at Tjikandi were a failure, and subsequent attempts to establish sugar plantations in the district fared little better. Company, and that in the process they became deeply indebted to both firms.
As far as Palmer and Company were concerned, it appears that even as early as 1818 their balance with their Batavia agents amounted to approximately one lac of rupees. Deans Scott and Company, Palmer complained to a Londón business associate, were "drawing a great profit on the produce of the soil, but with somewhat too large a portion of our capital," 30 while two years later he was hopefully discussing the possibility of "a very considerable reduction of their debt to us this year." Essentially, moreover, these debts were trading debts, the result of the non-remittance of the profits of the Java trade and their investment instead in speculations within the colony. Nor was it only Palmer's money which was at stake: Paxton Cockerill Trail and Company were also involved. In 1818-19, they financed the entry into the Batavia firm of the Scots merchant Robert Morris 31 and, as they ruefully reminded Palmer a few years later,
The sums carried to the partnership of 1819 were only part of our large demands on that firm. We can only repeat what we have already urged in our letters to your house -that we are astonished at the results of our connection with them. We sent consignments on the Juliana and other ships, and never received returns. We took up bills on the most positive assurances of remittances to cover them. We do not know what large losses were incurred by them since our advances and the introduction of Mr. Morris, and yet an immense property appears to be sunk. 32 In view of Deans Scott and Company's mounting debts, Morris's entry into the Batavia firm was clearly intended to be in the nature 30 I infer that you have taken the Tjikandi estate upon your shoulders (Brownrigg wrote from Calcutta in August 1821) and so f ar perhaps as it was already there, we are now no worse off than we were; one objection occurs to me, which, however, may not be material. While Abbott's debt was to Deans Scott and Company, there was a good and sufficient check over him on the spot. This will now be removed, and our only security is the character and honesty of the individual, a nature of security I would only take where I could get none else . . .
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Abbott's death at the close of 1823 removed at least this uncertainty, and resulted in the plantations passing entirely into the hands of Palmer and his London associates. The situation remained extremely complex, however, for although Palmer was prone to describe himself as Virtual owner' 40 of the Tjikandi Ilir plantations, in point of fact his legal title was non-existent.
The Tjikandi Ilir district lay in the eastern extremity of Bantam Residency and extended over an area of approximately 16,000 bouw of low-lying ground. 41 As has been mentioned, plantations were begun there c. 1816, with financial support from Deans Scott and Company. The planters alleged that they had been promised the land by the out-going British regime, but were unable to provide substance for their claims. Subsequently, neither they nor their financiers in Batavia were able to persuade the Dutch colonial authorities to sell Tjikandi on terms agreeable to both parties. 42 The result was that the government retained control of the district and the planters remained there on sufferance. This was how things stood when Palmer took over Deans Scott and Company's interest in Tjikandi Ilir in 1821. It was not until seven years later, in 1828, that the matter was finally resolved by Palmer's purchase of the entire Tjikandi Ilir district from a newlyarrived and rather more tractable Dutch Commissioner-General. Before 1828, Palmer was simply the claimant to the district, not its owner, and this in itself tended to complicate the development of plantations at Tjikandi. Nevertheless, the protracted wrangle over the ownership of the district is only one of the factors which need to be taken into account in any attempt to explain the general lack of success of the Tjikandi plantations during the period of Palmer's connection with them. The subject is one which needs to be examined in some detail, because what happened at Tjikandi may well be illustrative of the general difficulties facing privately-run plantations in Western Java in the decade or so prior to the introduction of the Cultivation System in 1830.
The first plantation erop grown at Tjikandi Ilir had been cotton, but this had proved a failure, probably because the ground was too wet. 43 Following this abortive venture, and in line with developments on some of the big estates to the east, a fairly elaborate sugar factory was set up at Tjikandi. The milis for crushing the cane appear to have been worked by oxen in the primitive manner typical of the technologically backward Java sugar industry of the early nineteenth century. Significantly, however, the milis themselves and the equipment for boiling the sugar were imported into the colony from Mauritius and were, therefore, presumably of rather more advanced design than those traditionally used in the colony. In this respect, the sugar factory at Tjikandi Ilir provides an interesting example of the way in which the new mercantile investment in plantations tended to promote technological advance. The outcome, in this particular case, however, was far from satisfactory. Sugar was a disastrous failüre and the project was abandoned within three years of its commencement.
The difficulties were several. The whole Tjikandi district was very sparsely populated and this in itself was a fertile source of trouble for the essentially labour-intensive sugar industry. 45 Only a few people from the surrounding villages could be found to work in the factory br cane fields and as a consequence, the European planters had recourse to labour recruited considerably farther afield, primarily from the Tjeribon Residency, well to the east of Batavia. 40 It would seem, however, that despite the recruitment of workpeople from Tjeribon, the labour available for the sugar industry at Tjikandi remained both inadequate and unreliable. 47 According to^ one hostile contemporary, part of the problem was that the European planters paid such miserable wages that they could scarcely hope-to attract other than fugitives and vagabonds, with the result that the size of their workforce fluctuated wildly between several hundred and almost nil. From the planter's point of view, however, the difficulty clearly lay in the fact that while the price of sugar was falling the price of rice, with which the workers were partly paid, was rising steeply. In March 1822, for instance, one of Governor-General Van der Capellen's closest advisors drew the government's attention to the "extraordinary dearness of grain ... and the rise of all day and work wages resultant upon this." 49 In this sense, the attempt to grow sugar at Tjikandi feil victim to rising costs which were a fairly widespread phenomenon in western Java in the early twenties.
The venture had begun in 1819-20. By the middle of 1821 one of Palmer's partners in Calcutta was already forcasting that Abbott's sugar plantations at Tjikandi would be "his ruin and our loss," and within a year even the optimistic Palmer had to "own that I hope but faultily from sugar and spirits, since the daily opening [sic?] of tropical produce infinitely exceeds the demand." There appeared to be some slight hope of exporting some of Tjikandi's output to Australia, but Palmer was forced to admit that this was only an outside chance, since his trade with New South Wales was much diminished. As things stood, Palmer was inclined to advise that the planters should try to find a local outlet for their product, adding that "if the Chinese frequent your estate, you will scarcely require foreign demands." 50 There is no record of what became of these proposals, but it is clear that by the opening months of 1823 the cultivation and manufacture of sugar at Tjikandi Ilir had been given up. "The reduced" prices . .. will not repay the cost" was Palmer's simple verdict. 51 Ever sanguine, however, he told his partners in Calcutta that Tjikandi was still very promising, "except the visions of rum and sugar." 52 In their place, indigo was to be manufactured, and the rum distilleries were to be converted into vats for the fermentation of the dyestuff. The plant was to be grown from seed sent from Bengal. Nonetheless, there was an air of desperation about the proceedings. "For heaven's sake," Palmer told Abbott, "husband the means at your disposal and save mous official's scathing analysis of the manner in which the plantations were run is at all correct, then it is plain that sheer incompetence cannot be ruled out as a prime cause of the disastrous train of events at Tjikandi Ilir. 49 It was this scheme for indigo manufacture which was put paid to by the sudden death of Joseph Abbott late in 1823. Thereafter the plantations, or such as remained of them, seem to have been left to degenerate into a virtual wilderness. It would appear that coffee was the only remaining plantation erop to be grown at Tjikandi between Abbott's death and the purchase of the whole Tjikandi Ilir district by Palmer and his associates in 1828. This proved no more of a success than sugar, cotton or indigo. The area was almost certainly too lowlying for its successful cultivation and in 1828 total production amounted to a mere fifty piculs. Under the circumstances there seemed no point in pressing on with its cultivation.
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Apart from the coffee, it would appear that by 1827-8 the plantations in the Tjikandi Ilir district had been more or less abandoned. Several contemporary observers testified that only a few traces of earlier developments remained. 55 In short, Palmer's connection widi the plantations at Tjikandi prior to his purchase of the area in 1828 was a singularly disastrous one from the financial viewpoint. His agents claimed that he had spent -and largely lost -as much as three hundred thousand guilders on the venture, 56 and although this sum no doubt lost nothing in its telling to the Dutch colonial authorities, they were not disposed seriously to challenge it. Clearly, both government and planters were in basic agreement as to the. general unprofitability of Tjikandi's plantations.
In view of the seemingly endless succession of losses and erop failures, it is not altogether surprising to find that Palmer was less than enthusiastic about the plantations, "those confounded concerns" as he described them to a London correspondent in 1824. 57 There were, moreover, a number of additional complications. Palmer's own financial position was deteriorating during the eighteen twenties and in the 53 interests of economy and prudence his Calcutta partners wanted to end their firm's connections with Java. During his stay on the island in 1821, they reminded Palmer that his object was "to wind in and not extend our concerns" and. enjoined him ("For God's Sake!") not to give any further financial backing to John Deans or to any other of the 'friends' at Batavia. 58 It would appear that despite this, Palmer did go ahead and make some kind of agreement with the new firm of Deans and Company, established in 1821 by three of the surviving members of the earlier partnership. 59 In doing so, however, he evidently overreached himself, for in the following year he was forced to report that his plans had been frustrated by the opposition of his partners in Calcutta. 60 One consequence of these reverses was that Palmer had no sooner taken over Deans Scott and Company's interest in Tjikandi Ilir than he began to look around for a possible purchaser for the plantations. Matters were not helped by the fact, previously explained, that neither Palmer nor his Java associates had a proper legal title to the district. What they enjoyed was a mere de facto possession, something which they could scarcely hope to transfer at public auction.
Accordingly, Palmer decided that the best and most profitable course would be to offer to abandon all claims to Tjikandi in return for compensation from the colonial government. Negotiations were opened sometime in the course of 1823, and towards the close of that year Palmer told his agent at Batavia (still the luckless John Deans) that he would, "cheerfully confirm the sale of Tjikandi if anything exceeding one lac of rupees could be squeezed out of the government."
61 By this time, however, the Van der Capellen administration at Batavia was itself embarrassingly short of money, and in no position to oblige Palmer, even if it had been so inclined. As a result, when the Calcutta merchant visited Java in 1824 (in connection with a proposal to float a loan on behalf of the hard-pressed Indies government) he was forced to report that, I have not been able to get anything done with the real property at Surabaya, Samarang or Tjikandi, and my hope of prevailing with the government to purchase them is certainly not increased by my present knowledge of their position. In view of his financial ties with the previous regime, Palmer feared that he would meet with a rough reception from the CommissionerGeneral. When they did meet, however, at the close of 1827, all went fairly smoothly. 63 The question of Tjikandi was raised again and, as before, Palmer's main object was to obtain compensation in return for giving up his claims to the plantations. "This last is the désideratum," he explained to Brownrigg, "but we may not disclose it." 64 In the end, however, the matter was not decided on these lines. Instead, Palmer agreed to buy the entire Tjikandi Ilir district, including the villages and sawahs for the sum of seventy thousand guilders, to be paid jointly by his firm and their London correspondents, Cockerill Trail and Company. 65 Nonetheless, it is clear that Palmer's ultimate intentions with regard to Tjikandi remained unchanged:
the advantage of acquisition, [he maintained in a letter to Calcutta,] is the better chance of sale, for rights and privileges being established, purchasers will be sure in their tenure and more alive to their interests than heretofore.
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In the interim, moreover, until a buyer appeared, there was every indication that Tjikandi Ilir would prove to be a profitable concern. In common with other landowners in western Java, Palmer's agents were now able to demand labour-services {Heerendiensten or corvée) from the peasantry of the estate and to levy one-fifth of their crops as rentor tribute.
6 ? Palmer was inclined as always to be optimistic,/expected Tjikandi to produce considerable quantities of rice and "did not see 63 Faes, Tjikandi, pp. 98-108. The money was to be paid in the Achterstand certificates of the Indies government, i.e., in the form of bills on the colonial treasury at Batavia. According to Palmer (Palmer tó Brownrigg, 16.7.1828, Eng. Lett. c. 127, p. 37) this meant that the real cost of Tjikandi Ilir was nearer to forty than seventy thousand guilders. In fact, Palmer had struck a singular bargain, presumably because the hard-pressed Commissioner-General hoped to enlist his support for a scheme to recruit mercenaries in Bengal to continue the fight against Diponegoro in central Java. As was pointed out by the scandalised officials of the Colonial Office in The Hague, the Tjikandi Ilir district had been sold to Palmer for a sum which amounted to rather less than four times its annual yield in Land-Rent. why indigo should not yield a handsome profit on the estate." 6S On the other hand, significantly, he made it quite clear that there was little or no question of further capital expenditure on the Tjikandi plantations, either from Bengal or from London. Indeed, he hoped that the revenues of Tjikandi would make good his losses elsewhere on Java.
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In January 1830 Palmer and Company went bankrupt, primarily as a consequence of unsuccessful indigo speculations in Bengal. 70 The failure of the firm meant, of course, that there was no longer even a remote possibility of further investment in Tjikandi Ilir from Calcutta. Palmer's share in the estate passed to his trustees, whose sole interest lay in selling the property as profitably as possible. In the event, however, they found themselves unable to dispose of the estate, which was still in their hands at the time of Palmer's death in 1836.
Oddly enough, Palmer's bankruptcy did not terminate his connection with Tjikandi Ilir. On the contrary, as agent for the trustees, he remained in close touch with the administration of the estate for at least another three years. Indeed, by a stroke of irony, Palmer's Letter Books for the period 1830-1833 tend to be more informative about the affairs of Tjikandi than they had ever been before. They form an important source of information about the fortunes of privately-run plantations on the eve of the introduction of the Cultivation System and during the early years of the System's implementation.
A number of significant changes were made at Tjikandi during this later period. In the first place, a new and apparently fairly capable administrator was appointed in the person of James Newland, 71 a young Englishman who had arrived in Java in the early eighteen-twenties and who had subsequently been employed by the owners of Pamanukan and Tjiassem, the largest estate in the colony. Unlike his predecessors (Joseph Abbott and Antoine Le Marchand), Newland appears to have 68 had no financial interest in the estate. He certainly made several abortive attempts to lease the property from Palmer's trustees in the early thirties, but his role was quite clearly that of salaried administrator. London East-India merchants Donald and Patrick MacLachlan, he had parted company with them by the early eighteen-thirties, when, as he informed his brother, As a house of business we are . . . perfectly independent of support in a pecuniary way either from London or Bengal. Our own capital will I trust carry us on. 74 By this period, moreover, MacLaine Watson and Company had largely ceased to receive consignments from Europe but were instead almost exclusively engaged in the intra-Asian Country Trade. 75 In addition to his commercial interests, however, Gillian MacLaine was owner of a coffee and rice growing estate in western Java and had a stake in several coffee plantations in the Principalities. 78 It is obvious that his talents, which appear to have been considerable, were not directed exclusively towards business. As agent for the Tjikandi estate he paid frequent visits to the property to supervise its administration, and was highly regarded by Palmer. His absence in Europe in 1831, for instance, caused the Calcutta merchant to remark to Edward Watson, MacLaine's partner, that his "return will probably have a favourable influence on the estate, for he is a better farmer than you, and equal to Newland ... "
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The main commercial crops grown at Tjikandi Ilir under the new regime were indigo and rice. Indigo was certainly the more ambitious venture of the two, and schemes for making a renewed attempt to grow and manufacture the dyestuff were already being nurtured within a few months of Palmer's definitive purchase of the estate in 1828. At the beginning of the following year he arranged for a supply of indigo seed to be sent to Tjikandi from Bengal and a new indigo works was constructed on the estate. 78 Nonetheless, from his vantage point in Calcutta he was in a much better position to see the dangers inherent in the scheme than were his enthusiastic agents in Java. Could indigo be produced cheaply enough to compete with that of Bengal? "For the general supply exceeds the consumption," he warned MacLaine Watson and Company in 1830, "and unless you can underwork Bengal, nothing can come of the cultivation." 70 In the event, Palmer's fears were proved well-founded. In 1829, the first year of cultivation, total production of indigo amounted to a mere thirty piculs, which Palmer feared "would not realize expenses and cost of works." 80 Matters did not improve in subsequent seasons. The cultivation of the indigo plant in 1831 was adversely affected by heavy rain 81 and the resultant partial failure of the erop brought further complications in its train. The indigo plant was grown by the peasantry of Tjikandi Ilir in return for monetary advances, an arrangement little to the taste of Palmer who, "with the seasons so precarious", would have preferred a system whereby the "tenants planted and delivered at a fixed rate per bundie set against their rents." As it was, the owners were faced with further losses because of the inability of the peasants to repay the advances which had been made. From the commercial standpoint, however, the most pressing problem was exactly what Palmer had always feared: the inability to compete with Bengal internis of costs. 82 .
Presumably on account of these disappointing results, the manufacture of indigo at Tjikandi Ilir appears to have ceased by mid-1832. Attempts were made to replace it with a number of other crops. Newland, the administrator, contemplated the cultivation of coconuts on a commercial scale, and a scheme was also on hand to revive the sugar industry at Tjikandi. Significantly, however, it was proposed that the cane should be manufactured in the Chinese manner traditional to western Java (i.e., with a primitive and inefficiënt, two-roller mill worked by oxen), which had the advantage of avoiding a repetition of the considerable expense incurred a decade earlier when modern milling equipment and boiling pans had been specially imported for use on the plantations. 83 In addition, it was planned to make another attempt to grow cotton on the estate, although Palmer was pessimistic about the chances of success. 84 In the end, however, none of the alternative plantation crops proved anymore successful than indigo. The owners concluded that sugar required too large an outlay for their resources and that coffee, cotton and even the cultivation of the indigo plant were "best left to the natives." 85 The private European developers of Tjikandi Ilir had, by 1832-3, virtually abandoned their attempts to grow plantation crops for export and had begun to concentrate instead on the cultivation of rice for sale within the colony.
Rice was, indeed, a erop which from the landowners viewpoint had a number of marked advantages over other cultivations. It was, as Palmer remarked, "the cheapest, surest and most promising of good results," 86 and, as early as the negotiations for the purchase of Tjikandi Ilir in 1828, he had been quick to point out to his partners that, Considerable extension of the sawah cultivation is practicable . . . and altho' this cannot be effected without expense, its accomplishment may be assured out of existing rents and temporary exemption [of the peasantry] from assessement. 87 In short, rice was a erop which the peasantry were used to cultivating, which demanded relatively little capital outlay for its further development and which, finally, was assured of a sale in Java itself and not subject, therefore, to the vagaries of foreign markets. 88 Moreover, after the arrival in the colony of Governor-General Van den Bosch and the subsequent inauguration of the Cultivation System in 1830-31, it seemed probable that the demand for rice would increase in proportion to the government's insistence on the cultivation of plantation crops in those parts of Java which came under its direct control. In this sense, the Cultivation System might well prove advantageous to the privatelyowned estates, as Palmer was quick to realise. Although he regretted "the erroneous policy of government cultivation and manufacture, and especially of articles with which Bengal can inundate or choke the world," nonetheless, it was clear that the System might well "improve rice estates and Tjikandi amongst them." As he pointed out to Watson early in 1832, rice could "never want a market with an increasing population and the devotion of lands to other branches of agriculture." 88 In these circumstances, it is therefore not at all surprising to find that one of the most common themes in Palmer's correspondence both with the administrator at Tjikandi and his agents at Batavia was that of the advisability of concentrating all their efforts on increasing the rice production of the estate. Indeed, as the hopes of profitable indigo or sugar cultivation faded, he began to insist that "all the better soil lands" should be devoted to rice. 00 Considerable efforts were made after 1828 to extend the sawah area at Tjikandi Ilir and, although the original intention may well have been to use the newly-created sawah for the cultivation of plantation crops such as indigo and sugar, all the evidence suggests that by 1833 (at the latest) they were being used almost exclusively for rice.
One of the major problems involved in extending the sawah was that of draining the low-lying and marshy ground which appears to have covered much of the estate before the eighteen-thirties. To help solve this difficulty, administrator Newland began the cutting of a 'great drain' through the estate, and at the same time attempts were made to regulate and extend the irrigation system. A windmill was set up, apparently to improve the water supply at times of drought.
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The windmill was a copper-clad structure, and must have been fairly elaborate, since in July 1830 Palmer feit justified in complaining to 88 Watson that, "the completion of the windmill would have been more satisfactory had its costs been less and the engineer not continued so long in pay." w In the event, however, the mill was not a success. There was a "want of wind during the chief part of the working season," and then, early in 1832, it was entirely wrecked when a strong gust of wind caught the vanes. It was not re-built. 93 The amount of rice grown at Tjikandi and the profitability of the estate during the early eighteen-thirties is almost impossible to establish from the surviving records. In 1830 the rice production of the estate (presumably meaning the landlord's share of the peasant's rice-crop) was said to have scarcely covered costs and charges. Two years later, af ter a poor harvest in 1831, Palmer wrote to MacLaine that "the tardy increase of the rice culture disappoints me a little," though he seemed opthnistic about future prospects.
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It seems doubtful, however, whether this optimism was well-founded. Indeed, what few indications there are strongly suggest that rice did not bring the expected profits. At the time of his purchase of the estate in 1828, Palmer had calculated that the running costs of Tjikandi Ilir would probably amount to five thousand guilders per annum and that the owner's share of the rice-crop would produce annually something in the region of twenty-five thousand guilders? 5 In fact, it seems highly unlikely that this expectation was fulfilled. "We sadly want present profits there," Palmer lamented to Edward Watson in May 1832, and die floods which devastated parts of the estate during the course of the same year can scarcely have improved an already bleak financial outlook. As Palmer so aptly remarked, "that ill-starred estate wanted no addition of bad luck."
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The extent to which Palmer's misfortunes at Tjikandi mirrored the fate of private plantation development elsewhere in western Java in the twenties and early thirties is not at all easy to calculate. No other estate of the period would appear to have had its history so welldocumented in surviving records. Nonetheless, there are indications that the course of events at Tjikandi, in particular the relative failure of export crops and the increased attention paid to the cultivation of rice for the local market, was not unique. On the vast Pamanukan and Tjiassem estate in Krawang Residency, for instance, the somewhat scanty evidence suggests that similar difficulties were experienced and led to a similar outcome. It appears, for example, that a serious shortage of labour crippled an ambitious attempt at the large-scale manufacture of sugar on the estate in the mid-twenties, and that by the end of the decade the owners were relying primarily on the estate's teak and rice production for their economie salvation. 97 Moreover, those owners who persisted in their attempts to manufacture sugar on a large-scale (Uke Jessen Trail and Company, owners of the Bekassi estate to the east of Batavia) clearly laboured under mounting difficulties and probably only survived at all because of governmental assistance in obtaining an adequate work-force. 98 In short, what took place at Tjikandi was probably fairly typical of what was happening throughout western Java during the later eighteen-twenties. Ambitious and capital-consuming efforts to grow crpps suitable for export were giving way to a less-costly emphasis on supplying food for local markets. Nor is it at all clear that even this procedure enabled the landowners of western Java to ensurè the profitability of.their estates. There are signs, indeed,,that this early mercantile foray ihto" the sphëre of plantation-irivestment prbduced miserable results not only in Palmer's case but also more generally. Witness, for example, the declining value of estate-land in western Java in the later twenties," and the ingenuous comment of the owners of Pamanukan and Tjiassem a few years later that the administration of these estates has been conducted hitherto in a marmer 97 There is, of course, another general conclusion of some importance to be drawn from this survey of John Palmer's twenty-year connection with plantation development at Tjikandi, and this concerns the interna! dynamics of mercantile investment in commercial agriculture in Java during the earlier nineteenth century.
It is fairly generally admitted that the local European merchants played some, rather ill-defined part in the financing of plantation development in Java prior to the introduction of the Cultivation System in 1830. It is perhaps less widely recognised, nonetheless, to what extent, even by the 1820's, some of the major firms in the colony were bound up with commercial and financial circles in British India and Europe. The case of Deans Scott and Company, their links with Palmer and (through him?) with the London East-India house of Paxton Cockerill Trail and Company, points to the impossibility of discussing the plantation investments of colonial merchants in isolation from the character of their overseas connections. Quite clearly, a firm like Deans Scott and Company operated on capital which was a mixture of their own, locally accumulated funds and surplus trading profits which' belonged to their overseas correspondents. In the circumstances, it is scarcely possible to speak of their financial autonomy or to discuss investment in neatly separated categories of 'colonial' and 'metropolitan' capital.
Autonomy of action, however, the Batavia firms do seem to have had in plenty, and one of the most intriguing aspects of the whole Tjikandi business is whether Deans Scott and Company's initial investment took place on the firm's own initiative or upon authorisation from abroad. This is something upon which the surviving records are silent, yet the general tenor of Palmer's correspondence with his agents in Batavia gives the distinct impression of his having been involved somewhat unwillingly with Tjikandi, which became his largely because he could see no other way of recovering the losses incurred through the collapse of Deans Scott and Company. If this was indeed the case, then it would suggest caution in evaluating the character of overseas mercantile investment in Java in the earlier nineteenth century. In the first place (and in marked contrast with what took place in the second half of the century) there appears to have been no direct export of capital to the colony. The money invested was locally accumulated surplus trading capital. Secondly, unless Palmer's experience was unique, there is a strong suggestion that overseas mercantile houses were drawn into the sphere of plantation investment through the unauthorised speculations of their colonial correspondents. Not until the later nineteenth century did the initiative for investment in Java's plantations clearly originate in metropolitan Europe.
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